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DAMAGES
JAMEES H. FowLEs, JR.*
IMPROPER ELEMENT OF DAMAGES
SUBMITTED TO JURY
Brown v. Finger' involved the method by which verdicts rest-
ing in part on an improper element of damage are corrected.
The plaintiff had instituted a suit for loss of consortium, and
the jury was allowed to consider loss of wages which was im-
proper.
The trial court, on motion for judgment n.o.v., granted a new
trial nisi contingent on the plaintiff remitting what the trial
court apparently computed as the maximum possible portion of
the verdict attributable to loss of earnings by the wife. As, under
the instructions to the jury, the loss of future earnings could
have been considered by the jury, such a verdict could not be
cured by a new trial nisi. The proper method for correcting such
a verdict in that instance is to grant a new trial absolute. It has
been well settled that where an improper element of damages
has been submitted to a jury, its verdict cannot be cured by re-
mission of an amount representing the erroneous item where
the record does not show the amount of the improper item.
This case also lays at rest any doubts as to whether or not
earnings of a wife may be recovered by the husband in a suit
seeking loss of consortium. The loss of a wife's wages are not
recoverable. The wife is entitled to sue for such a loss and thus
the husband is precluded.
APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES
In Shearer v,. DeShon2 one defendant requested a charge to
the effect that if the jury should find both defendants liable to
the plaintiff, it could determine the amount of actual damages and
apportion that amount between the defendants. The jury returned
a verdict of $11,000.00 apportioned at $10,000.00 to one defendant
and $1,000.00 as to the other. The defendant, DeShon, who re-
quested the apportionment, and against whom the $10,000.00
verdict was returned, complained that the apportionment was
not consistent with the relative culpability of the defendant. The
court held that the requested instruction imposed no duty on
*Attorney at Law, Columbia, South Carolina.
1. 240 S.C. 102, 124 S.E.2d 781 (1962).
2. 240 S.C. 472, 126 S.E.2d 514 (1962).
191
1
Fowles: Damages
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the jury to apportion according to the relative culpability of the
defendants; therefore DeShon could not complain of the ap-
portionment.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In SoutA Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Florence Sporting Goods,
Ino.3 the plaintiff brought claim and delivery proceedings
against the defendant. The chattel mortgage held by the plaintiff
covered nineteen boat-trailers, one of which was described as
bearing serial number 18163. In the affidavit in claim and de-
livery one boat-trailer was described as bearing serial number
19114. There was no conflict in regards to the remaining eighteen
boat-trailers. The conflict arose in connection with the taking
by the sheriff of the boat-trailer with serial number 19114. The
defendant counterclaimed in the action for the wrongful taking
of this boat-trailer, which the defendant asserted belonged to
him. The defendant also sought, and recovered, punitive dam-
ages for this taking.
The trial court, after a jury verdict for the defendant for
actual and punitive damages, gave judgment n.o.v. for the
plaintiff as to the punitive damages.
The Supreme Court found that the record showed no evidence
to indicate willfulness on the part of the plaintiff in the taking
of this boat-trailer. The plaintiff had substituted on its books
prior to the bringing of the claim and delivery proceedings, the
serial number 19114 for the boat-trailer bearing serial number
18163. The Supreme Court went further, however, noting that'
even if the trial judge were in error in holding that there was
no evidence to indicate willfulness on the part of the plaintiff,
that Section 10-2516 of the 1952 Code would preclude a recovery
by the defendant of punitive damages. This section will not al-
low the recovery of punitive damages where the plaintiff posted
the bond required by Section 10-2505 of the 1952 Code for any
acts occurring after posting the bond. Since the only act com-
plained of by the defendant which occurred prior to the filing
of the bond was the substitution of the numbers on the bank's
records and which the court held invaded no right of the de-
fendant, he sustained no damage.
This additional ground adds little to the decision, however,
since if the trial court erred in finding no willfulness on the
part of the plaintiff, the posting of a bond would not preclude
3. 241 S.C. 110, 127 S.E.2d 199 (1962)
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a finding of punitive damages. For if the trial court had erred
and there was evidence to indicate willfulness, the act complained
of would have occurred prior to the posting of the bond. Con-
sequently, the bond would have no effect on punitive damages.
It was interesting to note the method in which the court ar-
rived at a finding that a bond had been posted. The record was
silent on this point, and the court presumed that the sheriff had
required the bond prior to seizing the goods in claim and de-
livery.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Our Supreme Court has held that the obligations of a person
assuming a mortgage upon purchasing real property is not one
of indemnity. That question arose in Jones v. Bates.4 The plain-
tiff had conveyed certain real property to the defendant, the
consideration being $400.00 and the assumption of a note and
mortgage, which at the time, had an unpaid balance of $8,059.95.
The defendant in turn conveyed to a third party. Upon default
by this third party foreclosure proceedings were instituted. As
the Veterans Administration had guaranteed this loan, they
eventually were called upon to pay the differential between the
amount of the note and mortgage and what the property brought
at public sale. The Veterans Administration in turn called upon
the plaintiff to pay the deficiency. The plaintiff then entered
into an agreement with the Veterans Administration whereby
the plaintiff began making installment payments at the rate of
five dollars per month.
The present action was instituted by the plaintiff to recover
from the defendant the entire deficiency. The court found the
plaintiff entitled to that amount which would place him in the
same position as if the contract had been fulfilled. It, therefore,
followed that the fact that the plaintiff had not paid the Vet-
erans Administration the full amount was of no importance.
As the defendant's obligation was not to indemnify the plaintiff,
but to fulfill the contract, the defendant must pay -that amount
that would satisfy the note and mortgage.
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE AGAINST
INJUNCTION BOND
In Hyler v. Wheeler 5 the defendant, afer a successful de-
cision in the principal case, brought the present proceedings to
4. 241 S.C. 189, 127 S.E.2d 618 (1962).
5. 240 S.C. 386, 126 S.E.2d 173 (1962).
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ascertain the damages recoverable by reason of the plaintiff's
enjoining ejectment proceedings.
The present defendant had previously obtained an order eject-
ing the present plaintiff from a dwelling where the plaintiff
lived. The plaintiff then sought and obtained a temporary in-
junction enjoining her ejectment. She posted a $5,000.00 bond
pursuant to this injunction. The defendant then moved to have
the damages which she sustained as a result of the injunction
assessed. The master found, and it was affirmed by the circuit
court, that the defendant was entitled to damages due to the
issuance of the injunction in an amount exceeding the $5,000.00
bond, although the liability of the sureties was limited to the
amount of the bond together with the costs pursuant to the
proceedings to determine the damages.
The Supreme Court upheld this finding, and the criteria for
assessing the loss of use of the property which was that of the
reasonable rental value.6 The allowance of costs in excess of
the bond was also affirmed by the Supreme Court. It should be
noted that only those costs incurred in ascertaining the damages
recoverable were allowed in excess of the bond.
7
The court also held that any damages incurred during the
period from the dissolving of the injunction until the premises
were actually vacated were recoverable on the bond. The court
stated that as the bond was effective to take possession of the
property, it certainly was effective to guarantee its return: con-
sequently the injunction bond protected Mr. Wheeler not only
while the injunction was in force but also for a reasonable length
of time thereafter until possession could be obtained. This, it
was held, was not an extension of the liability on the bond by the
sureties as the damages sustained during this period proximately
flowed from the issuance of the injunction.
This result seems unduly harsh as to the sureties. At the time
the bond was posted, Mrs. Hyler was in possession with the
sheriff preparing to eject her under court order. It will be noted
that this was the identical situation when the injunction was
dissolved. Therefore, the court is seemingly holding the sureties
responsible for the sheriff's not immediately ejecting Mrs. Hyler
as was his duty. The court justified this on the basis that the
6. Lipscomb v. South Bound R. P. Co., 65 S.C. 148, 43 S.E. 388 (1902).
The record showed that the property in question had a reasonable rental value,
being a residence and in fact rented.
7. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-1601 (1952); Hill v. Thomas
19 S.C. 230 (1882).
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delay in Mrs. Hyler's vacating the premises proximately flowed
from the issuance of the injunction.
EXCESSIVE DAMAGES
During the period under review the question of excessive
damages was raised in Doremus v. Atlantic Coastline R.R.,8 Reid
v. Strikland,9 Gaines v. ThomaslG and Norton v. Ewaskio."I
The court found that in no case did the record indicate an abuse
of discretion by the trial court. The last case cited, Norton V.
Ewaskio,12 presented the interesting question as to whether or not
the known lack of wealth of the defendant would show prejudice,
bias and passion on the part of a jury in finding punitive dam-
ages. The court stated that there was no requirement that the
defendant be a man of means before punitive damages are justi-
fied.
MISCELLANEOUS
In Hopkins v. Fidelity Ins. Co. 13 the plaintiff was found to
have sustained mental damages. This was an action brought by a
mother for alleged damages occurring due to the fraud and de-
ceit of the defendant in procuring a release from her which she
maintained barred her from recovering for the death of her
child. The court held that if the release was fraudulently ob-
tained, this would not bar an action brought by the personal
representative under Section 10-1952 of the 1952 Code. On the
other hand, if a cause of action for the death of the child did
not exist, then it is quite obvious that the mother sustained no
damages by the release even if fraudulently obtained.
In the case of Shoreland Freezers, Inc. v. Textile Ice & Fuel
Co.,14 the plaintiff placed certain frozen foods with the de-
fendant, a warehouse, for storage. Damage resulted to the goods
for which the plaintiff sued the defendant.
The court held that even though the defendant may have been
responsible for damage to the goods, it was, none-the-less, entitled
to its storage charges. The reason for such a holding was that
if the defendant made the losses good to the plaintiff for the
8. 242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E.2d 370 (1963).
9. 242 S.C. 166, 130 S.E.2d 416 (1963).
10. 241 S.C. 412, 128 S.E.2d 692 (1962).
11. 241 S.C. 557, 129 S.E.2d 517 (1963).
12. Ibid.
13. 240 S.C. 230, 125 S.E.2d 468 (1962).
14. 241. S.C. 537, 129 S.E.2d 424 (1963).
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damage to the merchandise, the plaintiff was then in the position
he would be in if no damage had occurred; consequently storage
charges should be paid. Stated differently, if a warehouseman
makes reimbursement for any damage to goods stored by him he
has fulfilled his part of the contract, and entitled to storage
charges.
The case of Durant v. Palmetto Chevrolet Company15 is of
particular interest regarding proof required to establish the
value of automobiles. The question in this case, inter alia, was
whether or not there was sufficient evidence as to the value of
an automobile from which a jury could assess damages. The
defendant had sold the plaintiff a new Chevrolet automobile in
1959. This car was defective, and the plaintiff subsequently
traded the Chevrolet to a third party apparently as a down-
payment on a Ford automobile. The defdndant contended that
there was no evidence tending to show the value of the Chevrolet
automobile when it was disposed of by the plaintiff. The court
recognized that the measure of damages in this case would be
the differential in the value of the Chevrolet automobile at the
time the plaintiff purchased it, and at the time he disposed of
it. The court saw as the real basis for the defendant's contention
the absence of opinion evidence as to the value of the Chevrolet
on the day of the second sale. As there was testimony on the
amount paid for the Ford, the court felt that the jurors as aver-
age men, well informed about automobiles, could calculate the
amount allowed by this third party for the Chevrolet on the
subsequent purchase of the Ford. Consequently, opinion evidence
as to value was unnecessary.
15. 241 S.C. 508, 129 S.E.2d 323 (1963).
[Vol. 16
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [], Art. 17
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol16/iss1/17
